| 报告题目 | Product line design with seller-induced learning | ||
| 报告人（单位） | 熊慧（清华大学） | ||
| 点评人（单位） | 舒嘉 | 点评人（单位） | 张玉林 |
| 时间地点 | 时间： 2013年5月6日（周一）下午2点 地点：九龙湖经管楼B-201 | ||
| 报告内容摘要 | | ||
| 报告内容： In practice, some well-established service providers (sellers) offer the trial version or one-time experience for the services that have been introduced to the market for years. In this paper, we label these activities provided by the seller to help the consumers resolve their uncertainties as seller-induced learning. We show that, the seller-induced learning may facilitate a more efficient allocation as well as a more sophisticated price discrimination scheme since the seller can distinguish the consumers by whether they participate in the seller-induced learning. However, this may also exacerbate the information asymmetry between the consumers and the seller since the seller has no access to the new information the consumers obtain. Furthermore, when the seller-induced learning is intended for the price discrimination purpose, in general it should not be given for free. This avoids some consumers that do not exhibit valuation uncertainty from participating in the seller-induced learning and walking away without making serious contract choices. Collectively, our results indicate that the seller-induced learning is a two-edged sword due to the intertwined effects of information disclosure and information elicitation it brings to the seller. 报告人简介： 熊慧，清华大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程系博士，研究兴趣包括：供应链管理、机制设计、产品定价等。2008年，在留学基金委的资助下赴美国加州大学伯克利分校交流、研究，开展机制设计方面研究。博士毕业论文由刘丽文和Ying-Ju Chen共同指导，题目为《体验式服务产品的定价问题研究》。在进入清华攻读博士学位之前，获得华中科技大学优秀毕业生荣誉称号，并同时取得管理学和文学学位。以下为部分已有的研究成果： Hui Xiong and Ying-Ju Chen, 2013. Product line design with seller-induced learning, forthcoming in Management Science. Hui Xiong and Ying-Ju Chen, 2013. Product line design with deliberation costs: a two-stage process, forthcoming in INFORMS Decision Analysis. | |||
