报告题目 | Debt-Equity Conflict, Accounting Conservatism, and Executive Compensation | ||
报告人(单位) | 顾朝阳教授(香港中文大学) | ||
点评人(单位) | 吴芃副教授（东南大学） | 点评人（单位） | 韩静副教授（东南大学） |
时间地点 | 时间:2017年10月27日（周五）下午2点 地点：四牌楼东南院202 | ||
报告内容摘要 | |||
Debtholders and equityholders have different preferences for risks. In this paper, we argue that executive compensation combined with accounting conservatism can mitigate the debt-equity conflict. For example, spending on research and development (R&D) would reduce firm’s initial cash flow and increase firm risk that hurts debtholders. Conservative accounting would expense the R&D, resulting in lower accounting earnings initially, while the stock price would react positively when the R&D project has positive NPV. By tying executive compensation more to accounting earnings than to stock returns, managers would be punished for taking R&D due to lower compensation in the early years. Thus, they would be incentivized to stay away from R&D, to the benefit of debtholders. Using data from publicly listed firms in the U.S.A., we find empirical evidence supporting the above argument. In particular, we find that the CEO pay sensitivity to accounting return on asset (ROA) increases with financial leverage, a proxy of the equity-debt conflict. Such higher sensitivity is primarily driven by the bonus portion of CEO compensation. In addition, the results are mainly found among firms with higher accounting conservatism and higher uncertainty in operation, consistent with notion that protection of debtholders is most needed when the uncertainty level is high and most effective when accounting is conservative. | |||
报告人简介 | |||
顾朝阳博士现任香港中文大学会计学教授、工商管理学院杰出学人、会计学院院长。此前曾任卡内基·梅隆大学助理教授和副教授和明尼苏达大学卡尔森商学院副教授、霍尼维尔会计讲席教授兼会计博士项目负责人。顾教授研究兴趣主要集中于资本市场方面的实证研究，包括分析师与管理层预测、盈余管理、权益与债券估值等。顾教授在一流会计杂志发表过多篇研究文章，在诸多国际会议和学术机构演讲过研究成果。顾教授在清华大学完成英语本科，在中国人民大学获得外国现代管理硕士，后赴美国图兰大学获得经济学硕士和会计学博士，并拥有美国公证会计师(非执业)证书。 | |||
