报告题目 | Several marketing problems with durable goods in dual-channel supply chains | ||
报告人（单位） | 晏伟（重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，管理科学与工程系） | ||
点评人（单位） | 舒嘉,刘新旺，侯合银，王文平 | 点评人（单位） | |
时间地点 | 时间：2014年12月12日（周五）下午3点 地点：九龙湖经管楼B-201 | ||
报告内容摘要 | | ||
报告内容：My presentation will focus on several marketing problems with durable goods in dual-channel supply chains. We firstly develop a two-period dual-channel model for a durable goods manufacturer that can sell directly by its own e-channel and indirectly via an independent reseller to investigate how product durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. Our game-theoretic model nests Arya et al. (2007) [Arya et al., 2007. The bright side of supplier encroachment. Marketing Science 26 (5): 651-659.] as a special case when product durability reduces to zero and thus generalizes it to the durable goods setting. The equilibrium solutions indicate that, when the product is durable, both parties’ profitability strongly depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In particular, we find that, compared to encroaching the reseller’s market by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel that serves only as an information medium. Moreover, we find that, contrary to Arya et al.’s (2007) results, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer’s encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller, and thus its bright side disappears. We then address certain strategic issues associated with leasing and selling in a dual-channel supply chain. Specifically, we consider a two-period dual-channel model in which a manufacturer sells a durable product directly through both a manufacturer-owned e-channel and an independent dealer who adopts a mix of selling and leasing to consumers. Our results show that the manufacturer begins encroaching into the market in Period 1, but the dealer starts withdrawing from the retail channel in Period 2. Moreover, we find that both the dealer and the supply chain may benefit from the manufacturer’s encroachment. Our results also indicate that both the market structure and the nature of competition have an important impact on Coase’s conjecture. Finally, we consider a manufacturer sells new units through an independent dealer but with two options for marketing remanufactured products: (1) marketing through its own e-channel (Model M) or (2) subcontracting the marketing activity to a third party (Model 3P) and investigate how different channel structures for marketing remanufactured products affect all parties’ profitability as well as the environmental performance. A central result we obtain is that although Model M is always greener than Model 3P, firms have less incentive to adopt it because both the manufacturer and retailer may be worse off when the manufacturer sells remanufactured products through its own e-channel rather than subcontracting to a third party. Extending both our models to cases in which the manufacturer interacts with multiple retailers further reveals that the more retailers in the market, the greener Model M relative to Model 3P. 报告人简介： 晏伟，重庆大学经管学院博士生，研究方向为供应链与物流管理。迄今为止，已在《European Journal of Operational Research》上发表论文2篇，《Operational Research Letter》上1篇；另有《Marketing Science》（1篇，三审中），《European Journal of Industrial Engineering》（1篇，minor revision）。现为EJOR、IJPR、IJPE等多个SSCI、SCI期刊的匿名审稿人。 | |||
