报告题目 | Dynamic Management of Opaque Selling with Boundedly Rational Customers | ||
报告人（单位） | 殷哲 (华中科技大学管理学院) | ||
点评人（单位） | 舒嘉，刘新旺，侯合银，王文平 | 点评人（单位） | |
时间地点 | 时间：2015年1月16日（周五）下午2点 地点：九龙湖经管楼B-201 | ||
报告内容摘要 | | ||
报告内容： Why opaque selling is attractive to firms is received considerable attention in academic research. A recent paper (Huang and Yu, 2014) [Huang, T., & Yu, Y., 2014. Sell Probabilistic Goods? A Behavioral Explanation for Opaque Selling. Forthcoming in Marketing Science.] reveals that firms could improve profits by selling opaque products to boundedly rational customers. We extend this research to study a practically important problem, where a firm sells an opaque product over repeated seasons and has to dynamically determine its selling strategies. Customers have boundedly rational expectations and have to rely on past experiences, word of mouth, and anecdotal reasoning to make their purchasing decisions. Based on the anecdotal reasoning framework in the economics literature, we develop the firm’s dynamic programming problem over an infinite time horizon. We characterize the firm’s optimal selling policies depending on the market environment. When the product’s price is high enough, the firm should adopt a constant selling policy in the steady state. Interestingly, under the low-price market environment, the firm should sell the opaque product by cyclically adjusting between two policies. 报告人简介： 殷哲，现为华中科技大学管理学院博士研究生。主要研究方向：运营管理中的消费者行为、供应链中的供应风险管理。目前在《Omega》、《International Journal of Production Research》、《Annals of Operations Research》等SSCI、SCI期刊上各发表论文1篇，另有《European Journal of Operational Research》（1篇，accept after minor revision）。现为Omega、IJPR等期刊的匿名审稿人。 | |||
