学术前沿讲座-The Dark Side of Industry Tournament Incentives

报告题目

The Dark Side of Industry Tournament Incentives

报告人（单位）

Fei Xie（University of Delaware）

主持人（单位）

邵军

（东南大学）

点评人（单位）

时间地点

时间：2019年7月8日（周一）下午3:00点

地点：九龙湖经管楼B-203

报告内容摘要

报告内容：

We document distortions in corporate disclosure driven by industry tournament incentives, defined as a CEO’s pay gap relative to the highest CEO pay among industry peers. Controlling for CEO-firm pair fixed effects, we find that firms run by CEOs with stronger industry tournament incentives engage in more aggressive earnings manipulation, measured by a higher propensity of meeting or narrowly beating consensus earnings forecasts, larger abnormal accruals, and higher probabilities of committing financial misrepresentation and restating earnings. The evidence is concentrated in cases where ex ante CEOs are more likely to participate in or win the industry tournament, and where agency problems are more severe. Conditional on firm performance, CEOs with stronger industry tournament incentives also disclose positive (negative) more (less) frequently. Our findings imply that industry tournaments can create perverse managerial incentives in corporate disclosure decisions, and that one firm’s executive compensation policy can generate negative externality for other firms’ disclosure practice.

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报告人简介：

谢非（Fei Xie）教授，1998年本科毕业于清华大学，2005年获Vanderbilt University博士学位。谢非目前就职于University of Delaware金融系，任金融学教授及Iannaccone Faculty Fellow，同时兼任European Corporate Governance Institute研究员及《Journal of Financial Research》期刊Associate editor。谢非教授的研究领域主要为公司金融，相关成果发表于《Journal of Finance》、《Journal of Financial Economics》、《Review of Financial Studies》等金融学顶级期刊。