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学术前沿讲座—Coordinating Project Outsourcing Through Bilateral Contract Negotiations

发布时间:2020-10-10访问量:463


报告题目

Coordinating Project Outsourcing Through   Bilateral Contract Negotiations

报告人(单位)

邓天虎(清华大学)

主持人(单位)

薛巍立(东南大学)

李四杰(东南大学)

时间地点

时间:20201015 日(周四)下午14   

腾讯会议ID323 755 396(密码:202015

报告内容摘要

Project outsourcing has been a pronounced trend in   many industries but is also recognized as a major cause for project delays. We   study how companies can coordinate outsourced projects with uncertain   completion times through bilateral contract negotiations. Misaligned   subcontractor incentives may result in substantial losses to both project   clients and subcontractors. Coordinating subcontractors' efforts through   proper contracts is imperative to the success of project outsourcing.

Most previous studies on project contracting have   not addressed subcontractors' bargaining powers or the dynamic bargaining   process in negotiations. We fill in this gap by studying bilateral bargaining   between the client and subcontractors, which better reflects real-world   negotiations. Our study uncovers how the coordination of project outsourcing   is impacted by the contract form, bargaining power structure, precedence   network topology, payment timing, external opportunities, and negotiation   protocols. For single-task projects, the widely used fixed-price (cost-plus)   contract can achieve system coordination only when the subcontractor (client)   possesses full bargaining power. Cost-sharing and time-based incentive   contracts, which perform well for single-task projects, may not be effective   for projects with parallel tasks when any subcontractor's bargaining power is   sufficiently high.

Projects with serial tasks can be coordinated only   under certain extreme bargaining power structures. Delaying payments always   exacerbates the incentive misalignment.

报告人简介:邓天虎,清华大学工业工程系副教授,国际运筹与管理科学学会Franz   Edelman Laureates2008年毕业于清华大学工业工程系,获学士学位;2013年毕业于美国加州大学伯克利分校,获博士学位。主要研究智慧供应链的方法论框架和企业解决方案。负责执行的中石油天然气管网优化项目入围INFORMS设立的管理科学应用界最高奖项弗兰茨·厄德曼奖Franz Edelman Award2018年决赛。目前研究成果已于Operations   ResearchManufacturing   & Service Operations Management, Informs Journal on Computing以及Interfaces等国际学术期刊上获得发表。学术兼职包括期刊Omega-the   international Journal of management science的副主编。主持国家自然科学基金的优秀青年基金项目,参与完成国家重大、重点自然科学基金各1项。作为项目联系人组织国家科技部重点研发计划一项,主持海军军队项目2项。

  


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