Hendrik Devos 教授目前担任德克萨斯大学埃尔帕索分校金融系讲席教授、商学院副院长。他从纽约州立大学宾汉姆顿分校获得金融学博士学位，曾在俄亥俄大学任教。他拥有J.P. 摩根工商管理讲席教授职位。他的研究兴趣主要集中在公司金融和不动产经济学，研究成果发表在Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Accounting and Economics、Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Real Estate Economics等国际权威杂志上。他目前是Financial Review副主编、Journal of Financial Research的共同主编。他同时也是美国金融学会、东部金融学会、财务管理学会、南部金融学会、美国会计学会、美国不动产与城市经济学会、美国不动产学会等学术团体的成员。 |
Interdivisional externalities are largely overlooked in incentive design for divisional managers, when solving the capital allocation problem for multidivisional firms. We model the allocation problem and demonstrate how overlooking externalities leads to a distorted corporate objective function. Then we propose an optimal incentive scheme based on a corporate objective that does account for externalities. This optimal incentive scheme promotes overall firm performance, while also providing individual-based rewards. It incentivizes divisional managers to be truthful in the communication process with headquarters, which facilitates optimal capital allocation. The model is easy to implement, and yields a unique incentive package for each division manager. |
