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湖畔问道·风华论坛|Gender Reveals in the Labor Market: Evidence on Gender Signaling and Statistical Discrimination in an Online Health Care Market

发布时间:2024-12-10访问量:10

讲座题目

Gender Reveals in the Labor Market: Evidence on Gender Signaling and Statistical Discrimination in an Online Health Care Market

主讲人(单位)

何浩然(北京师范大学)

主持人(单位)

汪敏达(东南大学)

讲座时间

20241216日下午14:30

讲座地点

腾讯会议号:459-769-193

主讲人简介

何浩然,瑞典哥德堡大学经济学博士,北京师范大学京师特聘教授,国家级青年人才项目入选者,国家一级运动员。主要研究领域为行为经济学、实验经济学、劳动力市场、亲社会行为、团队决策、公共政策评估。近年来在Economic JournalJournal of Labor EconomicsExperimental EconomicsJournal of Economic Behavior & OrganizationSocial Choice and WelfareJournal of Economic PsychologyEconomics LettersChina Economic Review、《管理世界》、《经济学(季刊)》、《世界经济》等期刊上发表论文。

讲座内容摘要

A recent approach to testing for customer statistical discrimination involves studying price gaps between sellers from different gender, race, or ethnic groups and how they evolve as buyers obtain more information about seller quality. We consider a similar setting, testing for statistical discrimination against female doctors in an online health care market. But we show that this kind of analysis does not provide evidence on statistical discrimination in this setting because doctors have a choice about how strongly to signal gender. We develop a new approach to identifying statistical discrimination using doctors’ choices about signaling their gender. We find evidence of statistical discrimination against female doctors in male-dominated fields, and against male doctors in female-dominated fields. In particular, female doctors mask gender more strongly initially in male-dominated fields, and male doctors do the same in female-dominated fields. But in both female- and male-dominated fields the gender gap in signaling decreases with number of customer reviews of doctors. More generally, our evidence indicates how, in some markets, sellers may be able to reduce statistical discrimination by masking their group membership.


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