学术前沿讲座--Information and Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auctions

 We present a theoretical analysis of the strategic behavior of a bidder's cartel in a repeated procurement auction market. In order to investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the character and extent of bidder collusion, we assume that the purchaser adopt Bayesian update mechanism through which the purchaser can acquire information from the past auctions' bidding data to form his estimation of the expected future price. The purchaser will intertemporally substitute demand between adjacent periods in response to fluctuations in the auction price, and so his demand decision depends both on his expected future price and the current auction price. We then concentrate on how the cartel can both increase profits and mask its presence by passing misinformation to the purchaser. In fact, the cartel can adopt some informational strategies to misinform the purchaser and skew his intertemporal demand decision. Finally, we find that imposing a bid ceiling that exceeds the observed current auction price may be a feasible weapon for the purchaser to deter bidder collusion.

     王宏（1981.12～），男，湖北黄梅人，2010年博士毕业于上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院。主要研究领域为激励机制设计与金融市场微观结构，以独立作者或第一作者身份在国内外重要期刊发表论文10余篇，其中Economic Theory（1篇）（SSCI）, European Journal of Operational Research（1篇）(SSCI/SCI), 管理科学学报（2篇），中国管理科学（1篇）。主持国家自然科学基金“招投标中的串谋与最优激励机制设计”一项（基金编号：71101026），参与国家课题3项。目前是英国皇家经济学会会员（Royal Economic Society），并担任以下国内外学术期刊的匿名审稿专家：International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Journal of Economics, 管理科学学报等。