报告题目 | Optimal subsidy beneficiaries to promote electric vehicle adoption | ||
报告人（单位） | 冯博，苏州大学 | ||
点评人（单位） | 赵林度，东南大学 | 点评人（单位） | 孙胜楠，东南大学 |
时间地点 | 2024年4月10日10:50，九龙湖校区经管楼B203（科研中心） | ||
报告摘要： Electric vehicles (EVs) are increasingly approved as a disruptive technology that can limit oil consumption and reduce carbon emissions. Recognizing this, governments worldwide are continuously offering subsidies to promote EV adoption. However, the issue of identifying optimal beneficiaries remains inadequately addressed due to some critical though unexplored aspects. One of the conspicuously missing aspects is whether channel structures make a difference in selecting optimal beneficiaries. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore whom to subsidize (i.e., consumers, manufacturers, or both) to better realize the intended objectives under varying distribution channels of EVs (from retail channels to direct channels). Our analysis reveals that optimal beneficiaries to reduce consumer expenditure are largely affected by the channel structure while relying on the manufacturer’s R&D efficiency and consumers’ expectation for government subsidy. We also extend our analysis to show that when beneficiaries are well-selected, the direct channel, in most cases, outperforms the retail channel in terms of consumer expenditure and manufacturer’s R&D level. As such, our analysis provides governors with advanced guidelines to select subsidy beneficiaries and compelling evidence to encourage direct selling. | |||
报告人简介：
冯博，苏州大学商学院院长、教授、博导。教育部长江学者特聘教授，国家优秀青年基金获得者、国家万人计划“青年拔尖”人才。兼任江苏省新时代民营经济研究院院长和东吴资本市场研究院院长，担任POM-China战略咨询委员会委员、中国管理科学与工程学会常务理事等多个学术任职。 | |||
