报告题目 | Incentive Compensation in Multidivisional Firms to Solve Resource Allocation Inefficiency |
报告人（单位） | Hendrik Devos（University of Texas at El Paso） |
主持人（单位） | 浦正宁（东南大学） |
邀请人（单位） | 董斌（东南大学） |
在线会议信息 | 2021年10月18日上午9:00。 Zoom会议：https://zoom.us/j/83762962797 会议号：837 6296 2797 密码：无。 |
报告人简介 | |
Hendrik Devos教授目前担任德克萨斯大学埃尔帕索分校金融系讲席教授、商学院副院长。他从纽约州立大学宾汉姆顿分校获得金融学博士学位，曾在俄亥俄大学任教。他拥有J.P. 摩根工商管理讲席教授职位。他的研究兴趣主要集中在公司金融和不动产经济学，研究成果发表在Review of Financial Studies、Journal of Accounting and Economics、Journal of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, Real Estate Economics等国际权威杂志上。他目前是Financial Review副主编、Journal of Financial Research的共同主编。他同时也是美国金融学会、东部金融学会、财务管理学会、南部金融学会、美国会计学会、美国不动产与城市经济学会、美国不动产学会等学术团体的成员。 | |
报告内容提要 | |
Multidivisional firms have long encountered inefficiencies in resource allocation. Motivated by self-interests, division managers tend to transmit untruthful information to corporate headquarters, which leads to inefficient allocation. Traditional divisional incentive schemes or profit sharing either encourage unhealthy interdivisional competition or result in free-rider problems. In this study, we model resource allocation of a multidivision firm, and develop an optimal incentive scheme that induces truth telling by division managers, ex ante and, as a result, facilitates efficient allocation. The model yields a unique incentive package for each division manager. Distinct from extant theory, the proposed scheme quantifies interdivisional externalities, thereby recognizing the variation in divisions’ contributions to aggregate firm performance. We also consider organizational structure as exogenous given that organizational structure is costly to adjust. Without restricting the sign or size of the externality, the proposed scheme is applicable to multidivisional firms, in general. | |
