讲座题目 | A Co-Opetitive Game Analysis of Platform Compatibility Strategies Under Add-on Services | ||
主讲人 （单位） | 李武 (加拿大温莎大学Odette商学院) | 主持人 （单位） | 何勇 （东南大学） |
讲座时间 | 2024年12月23日14:00 | 讲座地点 | 经管楼B201会议室 |
主讲人简介 |
李武博士,加拿大温莎大学Odette商学院管理科学教授。主要研究方向包括供应链管理、决策理论与方法以及冲突分析等。研究获得三项加拿大自然科学与工程研究基金会发现基金项目的支持，同时也多次得到国家教育部春晖计划短期项目支持以及日本学术振兴会（JSPS）外籍聘用研究员（Invitational Fellowship）项目的支持于2011年和2015年到东京工业大学进行访问研究。自2001年以来，在国际期刊如Production and Operations Management, European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Part A, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Transportation Research: Part E, Water Resources Research等发表72篇学术论文，李武教授的研究工作得到国内外同行的广泛引用(SCI/SSCI累计引用3000余次，h指数31)，五篇论文先后列为ESI高被引论文，在相关领域产生一定影响，现任Group Decision and Negotiation（SSCI）和Information Sciences（SCI）的Associate Editor及多个其他国际期刊的编委和International Journal of Production Economics, Information Sciences, Industrial Management & Data Systems, Group Decision and Negotiation等客座编辑。 | ||
讲座内容摘要 | Large-scale platforms (LSPs) with valuation and awareness advantages have enabled competing small-scale platforms (SSPs) to be embedded in their platforms. This compatibility strategy creates a new channel, the compatible channel, through which customers can purchase services from an SSP via the LSP. Meanwhile, more platforms have been introducing add-on services to enhance their profitability. This study develops stylized game models to characterize the interaction between an LSP and an SSP, and explores their strategic and operational decisions on platform compatibility under add-on services. Our major research findings are as follows. First, we identify the conditions for platform compatibility: compatibility becomes an equilibrium strategy if the proportion of demand through the compatible channel falls within an intermediate range. Second, compatibility has opposite impacts on service pricing: At a low proportion of demand through the compatible channel, the two platforms engage in a price war; otherwise, they both raise prices. Third, we find that homogeneous add-on services stimulate rather than inhibit compatibility due to different foci of the two platforms. Finally, we conduct model extensions to further verify the robustness of the conclusions. Our results provide important implications to the burgeoning debate on when platforms should implement compatibility to achieve a win-win scenario under a variety of settings. | ||
