讲座题目 | Strategic Product-fit Revelation in the Presence of Network Effects | ||
主讲人 （单位） | Xiaomeng Guo （Hong Kong Polytechnic University） | 主持人 （单位） | 薛巍立，王杰 |
讲座时间 | 2025.4.10上午10:00 | 讲座地点 | 经管楼B201 |
主讲人简介 |
Dr. Xiaomeng Guo is an Associate Professor at the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. She received a bachelor’s degree in mathematics and physics from Tsinghua University and a Ph.D. degree in operations management from Washington University in St. Louis. Her research interests include operations-marketing interface, socially responsible operations, behavioral operations management, and supply chain management. Her research work has been published in Management Science, Journal of Marketing Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, and Production and Operations Management, etc. | ||
讲座内容摘要 | A consumer’s perceived value of a product is affected by two key factors: personal fit with the product and the total number of consumers purchasing and using it. The latter is driven by well-documented network effects. However, consumers often face uncertainty about their personal fit with a product. To address this, some firms invest in marketing strategies such as offering free samples/trials, virtual or physical showrooms, or other fit-revelation mechanisms, while others opt not to. This raises an important question. What is the optimal fit-revelation strategy for firms selling to consumers with fit uncertainty in the presence of network effects? To address this question, we develop a game-theoretic model in which a monopoly firm sells a product to consumers who face fit uncertainty prior to purchase and decide whether to facilitate fit revelation to resolve this uncertainty. Our analysis reveals the following findings. First, facilitating fit revelation allows the firm to raise its price to target better-matched consumers, though its effect on product demand depends on the strength of network effects. Second, as the strength of network effects increases, the firm’s optimal strategy may switch from not facilitating fit revelation to facilitating it and vice versa, indicating a non-trivial impact of network effects on the firm’s fit-revelation strategy. Third, fit revelation does not always benefit consumers; under strong network effects, it may reduce consumer surplus. Lastly, under strong network effects, even costless fit revelation by a third party can harm both the firm and consumers. | ||
