东南大学经济管理学院专题讨论（Seminar）登记表
| 报告题目 | Information security investment when hackers disseminate knowledge | ||
| 报告人（单位） | 高星（东北大学） | ||
| 点评人（单位） | 舒嘉，刘新旺，侯合银，王文平 | 点评人（单位） | |
| 时间地点 | 时间： 2013年10月11日（周五）下午2点 地点：九龙湖经管楼B-201 | ||
| 报告内容摘要 | | ||
| 报告内容：As an emerging and thriving research branch, information security economics has recently drawn significant attention from practitioners and academics. Traditionally, both decision and static game theoretical techniques are employed to characterize the strategies of firms and hackers. However, these techniques fail to capture the dynamic attribute of the risk environment, which is an increasingly important element, especially in modern distributed and complex computer and communication networks. Utilizing a differential game framework in which hackers disseminate security knowledge within a hacker population over time, this paper analyzes dynamic interactions between a firm endeavoring to protect its information assets and a hacker seeking to misappropriate them. In particular, we investigate three differential games in which the firm and the hacker move simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. We find that (a) the hacker invests the most in the simultaneous differential game, whereas the firm, as the leader, invests the most in the sequential differential game, and (b) both the firm and the hacker enjoy their highest payoffs in the sequential differential game with the hacker as the leader. Furthermore, it is numerically shown that in equilibrium, knowledge dissemination may not necessarily benefit the hacker and harm the firm. 报告人简介： 高星，现为东北大学经济管理学院管理科学与工程专业博士研究生，研究方向为博弈论和信息安全经济学。截至目前，已在Decision Analysis (SSCI)、Operations Research Letters (SCI)、Journal of the Operational Research Society (SSCI)、Mathematical Social Sciences (SSCI)、Computational Economics (SSCI)、Information Systems Frontiers (SCI) 等国际期刊发表和录用多篇论文，并担任Reliability Engineering & System Safety (SCI)等多个国际期刊的匿名审稿人。 | |||