| 报告题目 | One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination? | ||
| 报告人（单位） | Maoliang Ye Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance Renmin University of China | ||
| 点评人（单位） | 徐康宁 （东南大学经管学院） | 点评人（单位） | 邱斌 （东南大学经管学院） |
| 时间地点 | 2013年10月16日（周三）下午2点 九龙湖经济管理学院B-201会议室 | ||
| 报告内容摘要 This paper studies a potential mechanism to promote coordination. With the theoretical guidance via a belief-based learning framework with level-k thinking, we conduct a multiple-period binary-choice weakest-link coordination experiment in the lab to study how gradualism – increasing required levels (“stakes”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately – affects group coordination performances on high-stake projects. We randomly assign subjects to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high stake, starting at a low stake but jumping to a high stake after a few periods, and starting at a low stake and gradually increasing the stake over time (the “gradualism” treatment). We find that groups coordinate most successfully at the high stake in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two treatments. Our findings point to a simple mechanism to promote successful voluntary coordination when other mechanisms such as communications and information feedback are absent or limited. 报告人简介 Maoliang Ye is an Assistant Professor at Renmin University of China in Beijing, China. He got his Ph.D. degree in Public Policy from Harvard University in 2012. His key research interest falls into public economics and its intersections with experimental & behavioral economics, labor economics, development economics and political economy. Currently he is working on pro-social behavior (e.g., voluntary provision of public goods, coordination, cooperation and trust), incentives in team work, redistribution and charity, subjective well-being, public opinion and intergovernmental fiscal relationship. | |||