报告题目 | Intervention of Large Shareholders and Corporate Fraud —— Evidence from Vertical Interlock in Corporate Pyramids in an Emerging Economy |
报告人（单位） | 杨丹(北京师范大学) |
主持人（单位） | 王亮亮(东南大学) |
时间地点 | 2023年12月15日15:30，经管楼B201 |
报告摘要和内容： Through using 17,995 firm-year observations of all the Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2016 as a sample, we document that firms with vertical interlock have a lower likelihood of committing corporate fraud. We further test the underlying mechanisms, and we find that the effect of vertical interlock on the occurrence of corporate fraud is more pronounced when firms operate in a region with poor legal protection; with legal environment being enhanced in China, the effect of vertical interlock has become less significant; and the effect of vertical interlock is also more pronounced when firms exhibit poor information environment in the firm level. Our results in this paper imply that the role of large shareholders and legal protection are substitutes in an emerging economy, and even with rapid economic and legal development in China, large shareholders keep playing a positive role in controlling fraudulent behaviors in Chinese listed firms. | |
报告人简介：
杨丹，北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院副教授，博士生导师，MPAcc项目主任。博士毕业于英国阿伯丁大学（国家公派），曾任法国ESSEC商学院研究助理，美国哈佛大学肯尼迪学院访问学者（国家公派“青年骨干教师出国研修项目”）。入选财政部全国会计领军人才（学术类）。研究方向为会计准则、会计信息、财务管理、认知行为会计、公司治理。在Corporate Governance: An International Review、European Financial Management、Abacus、International Review of Financial Analysis、Finance Research Letters、《会计研究》、《中国会计评论》等国内外权威期刊发表论文30余篇。出版独著专著1部，合作专著3部。主持国家自然科学基金和教育部人文社会科学基金项目，并参与国家社会科学基金重大项目、重点项目、欧盟玛丽居里项目等课题研究。 | |
