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学术前沿讲座——Mechanism Design in Two-sided Markets in the Presence of Strategic Providers

发布时间:2024-05-24访问量:325


报告题目

Mechanism Design in Two-sided Markets in the Presence of Strategic Providers

报告人(单位)

姜力 (Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies)

主持人(单位)

薛巍立、陈静(东南大学)

时间地点

2024528日(周二)10:00

九龙湖校区经管楼B201

报告摘要和内容:

We comparatively investigate dynamic pricing and uniform k-double auction in two-sided markets managed by a platform. In a two-period horizon, customers are myopic in seeking services, while providers are strategic in fulfilling demand. In dynamic pricing, we derive the optimal pricing strategy, whereby the platform sets prices at the start of each period, while participating providers and customers are matched randomly. In uniform k-double auction, participants bid simultaneously, and matching takes place according to the policy adopted by the platform. We show that providers bid at discounted costs when customers have dominant bidding power, customers bid at valuations when providers have dominant bidding power, while the bidding strategies adopted by customers and providers follow the same structure when neither providers nor customers hold dominant bidding power. In either mechanism, the platform adapts pricing (e.g., skimming, penetrating, or stable pricing) to fit with market composition, including the distribution of customers over time (regular customers in period 1 and last-minute customers in period 2), and the availability of providers. Dynamic pricing can outperform uniform k-double auction in yielding profit to the platform only when there are few last-minute customers. The emergence of strategic provider behaviour discourages the platform from managing skimming (penetrating, resp) pricing but makes stable pricing more prevalent in dynamic pricing (uniform k-double auction, resp), while it enhances matching efficiency, the matching efficiency on the supply side in particular, in dynamic pricing. Such strategicity on the supply side is detrimental to the platform when there are significantly less last-minute customers relative to regular customers, while it strengthens the platform’s preference for dynamic pricing, particularly when customers have strong bidding power.

报告人简介:

Professor Li Jiang obtained his PhD in Operations and Management Science from the Ross School of Business in the University of Michigan. He joined the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies in the Hong Kong Polytechnic University in 2007 and is now a Full Professor. He holds a part-time appointment as Siyuan Chair Professor in Xi’an Jiaotong University. His research interests include data-driven operations, information sharing, credence goods, behavioural operations, and sharing economy platforms. He has published in Management Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, and Naval Research Logistics, and serves on the editorial boards for these journals. He also serves as a panel member of the National Natural Science Foundation of China. 



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